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SURVEY OF 2000 THROUGH 2002 SECOND CIRCUIT
CONSTRUCTION LAW DECISIONS
By Timothy S. Fisher* and Jason C. Welch**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys the construction law decisions of the Second
Circuit from the years 2000 through 2002. These decisions apply varied
legal doctrines, reflecting the dynamism of the construction industry.
Construction is a field where a diverse range of parties engage in
high-risk ventures under shifting relationships. Disputes are common,
as expectations are often frustrated. The resolution of these disputes
draws from more than just a set of core doctrines isolated to the
construction industry.' As can be seen from some of the cases in this
Article, resolving construction disputes requires the use of general
doctrines of law as they have developed specific application to repeating
fact patterns found in construction.2 The cases in this Article address a
number of these issues and include professional malpractice, economic
loss, arbitration, insurance coverage, subcontracts, suretyship and
pre-qualification.
Most construction cases, not involving claims against the federal
government, involve questions of state law and find their way to the
federal system through diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. The cases
selected for this Article present little exception to that precept, and deal
primarily with state law issues arising from the laws of the States of
Connecticut and New York.
In addition to Second Circuit decisions, this Article also contains
* Partner, McCarter & English, LLP and Chair, Construction Practice Group.
** Associate, McCarter & English, LLP and Member, Construction Practice
Group. The authors wish to thank Meghana D. Shah, a summer associate and a student
at the University of Connecticut School of Law, for her assistance with this Article.
1. The law of bid disputes, delay claims and changed conditions claims, for
example, apply specially to the construction industry.
2. Doctrines of general contract law, due process and insurance, for example,
frequently control construction disputes.
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district court decisions where they represent significant new holdings or
newly clarified holdings.
II. DECISIONS
A. Professional Malpractice
In 2000, the Second Circuit took the task of deciding a rather
arduous appeal from consolidated cases involving financially failing
hydro-electric plants in upstate New York. The case is Hydro Investors,
Inc. v. Trafalgar Power, Inc. 3 Although the issues are many and the
facts are complex, the case presents two narrow and concise issues for
the purposes of this Article, both of which broadly define the scope of
liabilities and damages that design professionals may owe to project
owners.
First, applying New York law, the Second Circuit held that a
design professional commits malpractice not only by generating a
technically unfeasible design, but also by the failure of its design to
meet a client's stated goals.4 Second, the Second Circuit held that New
York's economic loss rule does not apply to bar damages for lost
revenues arising from professional malpractice where the particular
negligent acts induced the project owner to undertake construction of
the project.5
1. Professional Malpractice
The claim of professional malpractice on appeal arises from energy
output estimates provided to the owner, Trafalgar Power, Inc. ("TPI"),
by the defendants Neal Dunlevy and the engineering firm that employed
him, Stetson-Harza (the "Engineers"). 6 Those estimates were used in an
analysis of costs and revenues provided to prospective lenders upon
which TPI and others relied and used to determine the location of the
power plants.7  The jury found that the Engineers negligently
miscalculated the water head at one dam8 and the bypass flow
3. 227 F.3d 8 (2d. Cir. 2000).
4. Id. at 15.
5. Id. at 17-18.
6. Id. at 12.
7. Hydro lnv., Inc., 227 F.3d at 12.
8. Id. at 13 (a dam's head is "the drop in height of water, from the reservoir down
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requirement at another.9 The Engineers moved to set aside the verdict
as a matter of law on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to adequately
prove professional malpractice and the resulting damages.10  That
motion was denied by the district court, and this appealed followed.11
On appeal, the Engineers alleged that TPI failed to prove that the
malpractice proximately caused the plaintiffs damage. 12 Specifically,
the Engineers asserted that it was not their negligence which caused the
two power plants to produce less energy; rather, it was the low head of
the river and a regulatory agency's requirement of a bypass flow that
resulted in less energy being produced. 
13
The court disagreed, stating that "[t]he legal cause of TPI's injury
was Dunlevy's failure to adequately convey the realities of [the dams]
with a level of professional care that would have allowed TPI to make
its business decisions with respect to those sites based on reasonably
reliable technical information.' 14  Presumably, TPI would have not
contracted to build the two dams, or would have made other
arrangements, had it been provided correct calculations.
With respect to other causes of harm on the project, such as
excessive construction costs and poor decision making by TPI, the court
stated that the Engineers need not be the sole cause of harm, only a
substantial factor, which they were. 15
The court's holding makes it clear that a design professional can be
found negligent for professional services that are not directly related to
physical flaws in a structure. In addition, malpractice may consist of
supplying incorrect information to a client on which the client relies in
making business decisions.
to the trailrace at the plant's powerhouse").
9. Id. at 13 (bypass flow is the flow off water which must circumvent the dams
energy generating machinery). The Second Circuit also stated that the evidence, taken
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, revealed that Dunlevy and Stetson-Harza had
little experience with hydro-electric projects; recent college graduates performed most
of the calculations; and Dunlevy's and Stetson-Harza's energy output estimates were
"overly optimistic." Id.
10. Hydro Inv., Inc., 227 F.3d at 14.
11. Id. at 15.
12. Id. at 15. The elements of professional malpractice under New York Law are
"(1) negligence, (2) which is the proximate cause of (3) damages." Id. (citing Marks
Polarized Corp. v. Solinger & Gordon, 476 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (N.Y. 1984)).
13. Hydro Inv., Inc., 227 F.3d at 15.
14. Id. at 15.
15. Id. at 15.
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2. Economic Loss Rule
The Engineers also contested the amount of the $7.6 million award
on the grounds that a part of the damages awarded against them were
"economic loss" that could not be recovered in tort.' 6  Their appeal
alleged that "the district court improperly permitted TPI to obtain a
damage award based on 'lost revenue' in violation of the economic loss
rule found in New York cases.' 17  TPI argued in opposition that
Engineers' professional malpractice fell within a narrow exception to
the economic loss doctrine.' 8 The court agreed, following a discussion
of the New York economic loss doctrine.' 9
The court stated that New York adopted the economic loss rule in
1982 with the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Schiavone
Construction Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp.20 The rule, as applied in New
York, bars recovery of economic losses sounding in negligence when
there is no property damage or personal injury.21  Consequently, a
claimant in New York is limited to an action in contract for the benefit
of the bargain only.22 Strict application of the economic loss rule to the
instant case would limit TPI's damages to only that which it could
recover under contract, not professional malpractice. Absent privity
with the defendant design professional this could severely limit, if not
16. Id. at 16.
17. Hydro Inv., Inc., 227 F.3d at 16. Connecticut is presently struggling with its
economic loss doctrine. Recently, in a case in which the authors appeared, the
Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, found that the economic loss
rule applies in Connecticut to bar claims against design professionals absent privity of
contract, property damages or personal injury. See Amity Reg'l Sch. Dist. No. 5 v.
Atlas Constr. Co., No. X06 CV 99-0153388S, 2000 WL 1161095, at *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jul. 26, 2000). The superior court based its reasoning by extending the supreme
court's holding in Flagg Energy Dev. Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 244 Conn. 126,
153, 709 A.2d 1075, 1088 (Conn. 1998), which held that "commercial losses arising out
of the defective performance of contracts for the sale of goods cannot be combined with
negligent misrepresentation," to bar tort claims against design professionals. The
decision was simultaneously challenged by a Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial
District of Stamford, decision which held that the economic loss rule does not bar tort
claims when privity is lacking if the damages were reasonably foreseeable. See Carolina
Cas. v. 60 Gregory Blvd., No. CV 98-0169383S, 2000 WL 350284, at *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Mar. 21, 2000). The Connecticut appellate courts have yet to decide the issue.
18. Hydro Inv., Inc., 227 F.3d at 16.
19. ld. at 16.
20. Id. at 16 (citing 436 N.E.2d 1322 (N.Y. 1982)).
21. Hydro Inv., Inc., 227 F.3d at 16 (citing 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc.
v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 711 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393, 271 A.D.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 2000)).
22. Hydro Inv., Inc., 227 F.3d at 16 (citing 532 Madison Ave., 711 N.Y.S.2d at
391).
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completely preclude, recovery.
The Second Circuit discussed the policy issues underlying the
economic loss rule.23 The court observed that the rule's policy goal of
providing predictability to commercial undertakings and avoiding
unanticipated liabilities24 must be reconciled with awarding of
appropriate damages to compensate for negligent acts.25
To resolve the tension between these two goals the Second Circuit
turned to Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp.26 In Sommer, the New York
Court of Appeals carved out an exception to the economic loss rule to
allow for an award of damages against a fire alarm company which
negligent acts of an employee caused millions of dollars in fire
damages.27 The New York court established six factors for a court to
examine in deciding to apply the economic loss rule.28 As viewed by
the New York court, the test is one of determining if a claim is truly a
contractual claim guised as a tort, in which case the doctrine ought to
apply and economic losses are barred.29 If, on the other hand, the claim
is closer to a pure tort, the doctrine ought not to be applied, and
damages should be recoverable. 30 The factors are as follows: (1) the
defendant's duty of care is derived not just from contract but from the
nature of services; (2) the defendant's industry is regulated by a
government body; (3) the defendant serves a significant public interest;
(4) a breach of duty by the defendant could have catastrophic
consequences; (5) the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant; and (6) that the loss was sudden rather than prolonged.31
After reviewing those elements, the Second Circuit held that TPI's
malpractice claim sounded in tort and was not a contract claim disguised
32as a tort. Based on that holding, one could presume that the court
reasoned that the Engineers should be liable because their services as
design professionals implicate public interests, are regulated by the
government, and have a standard of care that is defined by their
profession, not just by the terms of their engineering services contract.
23. Hydro Inv., Inc., 227 F.3d at 16.
24. Id. at 16 (citing 5th Ave. Chocolatiere v. 540 Acquisition Co., 712 N.Y.S.2d 8,
12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)).
25. Hydro Inv., Inc., 227 F.3d at 17.
26. 593 N.E.2d 1365 (N.Y. 1992).
27. Id. at 1369-70.
28. Id. at 1369.
29. Id. at 1369.
30. Sommer, 593 N.E.2d at 1369.
31. See id. at 1369-70.
32. Hydro Inv., Inc., v. Trafalgar Power, Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 18 (2d. Cir. 2000).
2004]
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The court also stated:
[T]he better course is to recognize that the rule allows such recovery in the
limited class of cases involving liability for the violation of a professional duty.
To hold otherwise would in effect bar recovery in many types of malpractice
actions.
3 3
This is an important holding, as it sets a clear exception to the
economic loss doctrine. Under Hydro Investors, Inc., a design
professional can be liable for the economic losses arising from the
designer's services as well as physical harm from design errors.
B. Arbitration
Arbitration agreements are common clauses found in construction.
Almost every form agreement, such as the 1997 edition of the American
Institute of Architect ("AIA") form agreements, as well as many
manuscripted construction contracts, call for arbitration. Even those
contracts that do not make arbitration mandatory often call for
arbitration at one party's sole discretion.
The following three cases deal with various aspects of arbitration
as applied in the construction context. The issues raised in these cases
include fraudulent application of the arbitration clause, use of arbitration
clauses as custom in the steel industry, and incorporation by reference
of arbitration clauses.
1. Garten v. Kurth
In Garten v. Kurth,34 the Second Circuit addressed the nature of a
fraud that may defeat an arbitration clause. The court applied the
federal "substantial relationship test" developed by the Second Circuit
in Campaniello Imports, Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia, S.p.A., 35 by which an
arbitration agreement may be voided if there is a substantial relationship
between a fraud or misrepresentation used to induce a party to enter into
33. Id, at 18.
34. 265 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2001).
35. 117 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 1997). In Campaniello Imports, Ltd., the court
reconciled two Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 396, 403-04 (1967) and Moseley v.
Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963), resulting in the substantial
relationship test. Id. at 665-68.
QLR
SECOND CIRCUIT CONSTRUCTION LAW DECISIONS
an agreement to arbitrate and the agreement to arbitrate itself.36 In
Garten, the Second Circuit held that a contractor's threatening "surefire
victory" in arbitration did not satisfy the substantial relationship test
between the arbitration clause in the contract documents and the
fraudulent acts of the contractor.37 As a result, the arbitration clause
was enforced.38
The plaintiffs contracted with defendant, Peter Kurth, to design a
playhouse behind their home for their daughter. 39  The defendant
estimated the construction cost to be approximately $180,000.40 The
defendant, as part of his duties, collected bids from various
contractors. 4' The lowest bids were from three companies which,
though not revealed to the plaintiffs at the time, were controlled by the
defendant.42 After one year of construction, the $180,000 playhouse
was incomplete and the plaintiffs had paid over $700,000 to the
defendant for his companies' work on the project.43
After escalation of the dispute the defendant told the plaintiffs that
their contract called for arbitration;44 he claimed that he was an expert at
arbitration and that the plaintiffs would have to hire a lawyer, incurring
additional expenses. 45 The plaintiffs brought the underlying suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
46
The defendant moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit.47 The
plaintiffs opposed that motion on the grounds that the defendant used
the arbitration clause as part of his fraudulent scheme to obtain
additional money from the plaintiffs.48 The district court denied the
motion to dismiss, finding that the court had authority to address the
allegations of fraud because they went to the arbitration clause itself.
49
36. Garten, 265 F.3d at 144.
37. Id. at 143-44.
38. Id. at 144.
39. Id. at 138.
40. Garten, 265 F.3d at 139. The average home sales price for the United States in
1999 was $184,200. See Montgomery County Park & Planning (July 2000) at
http://www.mcmncppc.org/research/data library/real estatedevelopment/housing/hc23
pf.shtm (citing the Federal Housing Finance Board) (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
41. Garten, 265 F.3d at 139.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Garten, 265 F.3d at 139.
46. Id. at 138.
47. Id. at 140.
48. Id.
49. Garten, 265 F.3d at 140-41.
2004)
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The district court specifically found that the defendant's statements that
he "knows arbitration like the back of his hand" and that the plaintiffs
would be better off paying him than going to arbitration, revealed a
substantial relationship between the arbitration provision in the contract
and the defendant's fraudulent scheme. 50
The Second Circuit reviewed the case law regarding fraud as
applied to the enforcement of arbitration clauses.51 In the end, it agreed
that the appropriate test was the substantial relationship test, but it
disagreed with the district court's application of the test to the facts.52
The Second Circuit acknowledged that courts are "to require some
substantial relationship between the fraud or misrepresentation and the
arbitration clause in particular., 53  The substantial relationship,
however, must be "more than a mere claim that the 'arbitration clause is
an element of the scheme to defraud'; it must include 'particularized
facts specific to the ... arbitration clause which indicate how it was
used to effect the scheme to defraud.'" 5 4 In the case at hand, the Second
Circuit found the defendant's statements were nothing more than
"aggressive posturing" and not used as a weapon. 55 The court claimed
that if it upheld the district court decision, it would "permit future
plaintiffs to avoid arbitration in all general fraud contexts by merely
citing comments made by their adversaries. 56
2. Aceros Prefabricados S.A. v. Trade rbed, Inc. 57
In Aceros Prefabricados S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., the Second
Circuit concluded that arbitration is so common in the steel industry that
the addition of an arbitration clause to a contract proposal is not a
"material alteration" of the contract.58 As a result, under Article 2 of the
New York Commercial Code, the clause was deemed included in the
parties' contract absent specific objection. 9
The issue presented to the court was a classic law school battle of
50. Id. at 141.
51. Id. at 142-43.
52. Id. at 143.
53. Garten, 265 F.3d at 143 (citing Companiello Imports, Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia,
S.p.A., 117 F.3d 655, 667 (2d Cir. 1977)).
54. Garten, 265 F.3d at 143.
55. Id. at 144.
56. Id.
57. 282 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002).
58. Id. at 102.
59. Id.
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the forms question to be resolved in accordance with Section 2-207 of
the New York Commercial Code.6° It arose from the following facts.
The Contractor, Aceros Prefabricados, S.A., ("Aceros") is a large South
American contracting company and TradeArbed ("TA") is an affiliate of
one of the world's foremost steel manufacturers. 61 The parties began
corresponding concerning Aceros' prospective purchase of steel from
TA.62 On January 12, 2000, about one month after that correspondence
began, TA sent Aceros a letter that purported to confirm Aceros' order
for steel, but did not contain an arbitration provision.63 TA then sent to
Aceros subsequent confirmations of orders that did contain arbitration
provisions.
64
Because Aceros considered only the January 12, 2000 letter as a
binding contract between the parties, Aceros maintained that it was not
bound by the arbitration condition referenced in the subsequent
confirmations. 65 The district court agreed with Aceros and found that
the January 12, 2000 letter constituted a binding contract between the
66parties. The court thus ruled that the arbitration provisions found in
the subsequent confirmations were proposals and not part of the
agreement because they materially altered the contract as a matter of
law.67
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
rejected the notion that the arbitration agreements, as proposed
additional terms, constituted material alterations to the contract as a
matter of law.68 Instead, it stated that the materiality of such proposed
additional terms must be examined on a case-by-case basis under the
preponderance of the evidence standard with the burden of proof resting
with the party that opposes inclusion.69
The court stated that "[a] material alteration is one that would
'result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness
60. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-207 (McKinney 1993).
61. Aceros Prefabricados, 282 F.3d at 95-96.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 96.
64. Id.
65. Aceros Prefabricados, 282 F.3d at 96. TA did not dispute that the General
Conditions of Sale, which contained the arbitration clause, were not actually enclosed
with the confirmations, but only referenced therein. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 96-97.
68. Aceros Prefabricados, 282 F.3d at 100.
69. Id.
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by the other party.' 70 With this standard, the court noted that Aceros
did not "submit any evidence demonstrating either subjective or
objective surprise at the inclusion of an arbitration clause."'', The court
also noted that "[u]nder New York law, an arbitration agreement does
not result in hardship or surprise where arbitration is the custom and
practice within the relevant industry. ' 2 Because arbitration agreements
are standard in the steel industry, it did not materially alter the contract.
Most large construction contracts call for structural steel. Thus, the
application of this holding to the construction industry is foreseeable.
Furthermore, as previously noted, arbitration provisions are common to
the construction industry itself. Although the holding of Aceros
Prefabricados is limited to the steel industry, its application to the
construction industry may follow under the same reasoning.
3. Choctaw Generation Ltd. Partnership v. American Home
Assurance Co. 
73
In Choctaw Generation Limited Partnership v. American Home
Assurance Co., the defendant surety sought to avoid a direct lawsuit
brought by the owner on a performance bond, by arguing that the owner
could only assert claims through the arbitration clause with the general
contractor.74 The surety succeeded, even though it had not signed the
arbitration agreement, because the owner was estopped from avoiding
arbitration of a dispute with a non-signatory where the non-signatory
has a close relationship with the parties bound to arbitrate, and where
the dispute is closely linked to a dispute that is subject to arbitration in
an underlying contract.75
The dispute arose from a contract to build an innovative power-
generation facility. 76  The plaintiff power generator, Choctaw
Generation Limited Partnership ("Choctaw"), entered into an agreement
70. Id. (quoting N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (McKinney 1993)).
71. Aceros Prefabricados, 282 F.3d at 100.
72. Id. at 101 (citing N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (McKinney 1993)); Bayway Ref.
Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 224 (2d. Cir. 2000)). See also
Chelsea Square Textiles, Inc. v. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co., Ltd., 189 F.3d 289, 296
(2d Cir. 1999); Schubtex, Inc. v. Allen Snyder, Inc., 399 N.E.2d 1154, 1155-56 (N.Y.
1979).
73. 271 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2001).
74. Id. at 404.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 403.
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with Bechtel Power Co. ("Bechtel") to build the facility.77 The project
was delayed, leading to an arbitration proceeding between Choctaw and
Bechtel. 78  Meanwhile Choctaw assessed liquidated damages and
collected them by drawing on a letter of credit, and then demanded that
the defendant surety, American Home Assurance Company ("American
Home"), surety on a performance bond, replenish the letter of credit.79
American Home rejected that demand, and Choctaw initiated this action
seeking an injunction ordering American Home to replenish the letter of
credit.80 American Home moved for an order to stay the proceedings
pending arbitration.
81
The district court issued Choctaw's requested injunctive relief and
ordered that American Home replenish the letter of credit.82 The court
also refused to order Choctaw to arbitrate the dispute with American
Home because the bond did not contain an arbitration provision and,
though the construction contract did, American Home was not a
signatory of that construction contract.83
American Home appealed the decision to refuse to compel
arbitration based on two theories.84 First, American Home claimed that
the bond incorporated by reference the construction contract, which
included an arbitration clause.85 Second, American Home claimed that
Choctaw was "estopped from avoiding arbitration of a dispute with a
non-signatory (such as American Home) where the non-signatory has a
close relationship with the parties bound to arbitrate, and where the
dispute is closely linked to a dispute that is subject to arbitration in the
underlying contract., 86  The Second Circuit agreed with American
Home on the latter of its two theories and did not therefore review the
former.87
In so holding, the Second Circuit identified that its precedent, as
established by Smith/Enron Cogeneration Partnership, Inc. v. Smith
Cogeneration International, Inc.,88 and Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am.
77. Choctaw Generation Ltd. P'ship, 271 F.3d at 404.
78. Id. at 403.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 403-04.
81. Choctaw Generation Ltd. P'ship, 271 F.3d at 404.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 405.
85. Choctaw Generation Ltd. P'ship, 271 F.3d at 405.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 406.
88. 198 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Arbitration Association,89 allowed the court to review "the relationship
among parties, the contracts they signed (or did not), and the issues that
had arisen, to arrive at the conclusion that the controversy was
arbitratable at the behest of the non-signatory." 90
Conducting that review, the court found that the controversy
between American and Choctaw was closely bound to the dispute
between Choctaw and Bechtel. 9' Both the underlying dispute
(Choctaw's entitlement to liquidated damages) and the dispute between
American Home and Choctaw (whether Choctaw could compel
replenishment of the letter of credit to fund the liquidated damages)
turned on the same facts and contract provisions. 92 Thus, because the
controversy at issue between the non-signatory and the signatory was
closely related to the controversy between the signatories, the signatory,
Choctaw, was estopped from refusing to arbitrate its controversy with
the non-signatory, American Home.
With this decision, the Second Circuit has subscribed to what is a
becoming an increasingly embraced doctrine in the federal circuits and
the states.93 Moreover, this issue has wide potential application in
construction disputes where a surety is involved. While the court did
not rule on the surety's first claim, that a surety can demand arbitration
with the owner because the bond incorporated the terms of the
construction contract, this decision comes close to having the same
practical effect. Unless a surety claims a defense specific to the bond,
its defenses to payment will often be those of the contractor in an
already pending dispute between the contractor and the owner. Thus, in
the Second Circuit and elsewhere, the surety can force the owner to
arbitrate.
89. 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995).
90. Choctaw Generation Ltd. P'ship, 271 F.3d at 407.
91. Id. at 406.
92. Id. at 407.
93. See, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th
Cir. 2000); Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57 (11 th
Cir. 1993); J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320-21
(4th Cir. 1988); Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Envtl. Org. P'ship, No. G029970, 2003 WL
21489113, at *5-7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2003).
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C. Subcontracts
The Second Circuit also decided a few decisions involving
contractual relationships between general contractor and sub-contractor
or sub-contractor and supplier-two of which are discussed following.
Both cases highlight the Second Circuit's willingness to allow
contractual provisions to be determined by the trier of fact.
1. Bolt Electric, Inc. v. The City of New York94
In the first case, Bolt Electric, Inc. v. The City of New York, the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
for the City of New York holding that an issue of material fact existed
as to the interpretation of language found in a letter of guaranty issued
by the New York City Department of Transportation ("City"). 95 The
decision underscores the importance of clarity in guarantee agreements,
which are frequently employed to maintain progress on distressed
projects.
The issue arose on the project to reconstruct the Eastern Parkway
in Brooklyn, New York.96 Bolt Electric, Inc. ("Bolt"), a supplier of
electrical materials, requested the letter when the general contractor
filed a bankruptcy petition.97 The letter of guaranty stated that the City
"will purchase from Bolt Electric, Inc. all materials ordered specifically
for the Eastern Parkway contract.' 98
The general contractor continued operations, however, and, after
the letter of guaranty was issued, the general contractor issued a
purchase order to Bolt for $2,126,746.00.99 That same day, the City
declared the contractor in default. 100  Because of the contractor's
default, Bolt did not deliver any of the materials called for by the
purchase order. 10' Thereafter, a completion contractor was selected by
the City. 10 2 The replacement contractor did not order any electrical
supplies from Bolt. 0 3 Bolt then sued the City for its failure to follow
94. 223 F.3d 146 (2d. Cir. 2000).
95. Id. at 150.
96. Id. at 147.
97. Id. at 147-48.
98. Bolt Electric, Inc., 223 F.3d at 150.
99. Id. at 148.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Bolt Electric, Inc., 223 F.3d at 148.
103. Id.
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through on the general contractor's purchase order. 
104
The district court granted a motion for summary judgment by the
City on the grounds that based on the plain language of the guaranty
letter, which stated that the City "will purchase from Bolt Electric, Inc.
all materials ordered specifically for the Eastern Parkway contract," the
City promised only to guaranty payment for materials specifically
ordered by Bolt to perform the project.'0 5 Because Bolt did not perform
on the disputed purchase order, it did not specifically order materials
and the City had no obligation to pay Bolt anything.
10 6
Bolt appealed, arguing that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to the interpretation of the guaranty letter.10 7 Specifically, Bolt
argued that the letter required the City to "step in and purchase from
Bolt the materials ordered by [the contractor] on the project," which
includes those obligations arising from the purchase order issued after
the letter of guaranty. 108
The Second Circuit held that "reasonable minds differ" as to the
interpretation of the operative language of the guaranty. 109 The letter
could be read in either manner, and, therefore, summary judgment was
inappropriate.'°
Parties to construction projects are frequently confronted with
insolvency problems in the midst of projects. Given the high cost of
delay in construction, and the procedural impediments to forcing a
change of contractors, owners often seek alternative credit arrangements
to keep projects going. Guaranty arrangements can assist in reaching
that goal. The Bolt Electric case illustrates, however, the risks entailed
in setting up arrangements without careful and detailed written
understandings.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Bolt Electric, Inc., 223 F.3d at 149.
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 150.
110. Bolt Electric, Inc., 223 F.3d at 150.
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2. Wright Lining and Construction Co., Inc. v. Tully Construction
Co., Inc."'
The next case, Wright Lining and Construction Co., Inc. v. Tully
Construction Co., Inc., is one of the few Second Circuit decisions that
relates exclusively to construction law. It deals with "deletion" clauses,
which are found in most sophisticated construction contracts, especially
in public civil work.
Deletion clauses allow owners to eliminate portions of the work
called for in the contract, with limited and predictable cost exposure to
the owner. The protections these clauses offer to owners come at a cost
to contractors. Contractors take significant risks when they bid on jobs
where there are economies of scale to the job, and synergies between
different parts of the work. When the owner deletes a part of the work,
the impact on the contractor may go beyond the price assigned to that
item. The case presents an extreme application by the owner of such a
clause.
In Wright Lining and Construction Co., Inc., the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision to allow the jury to resolve
ambiguous contract language."l 2 The court held, by summary order, that
the deletion clause in question was ambiguous when "applied to the
situation where subcontractor's entire performance was eliminated in
favor of a substitute subcontractor."' 
1 3
The issue arose on a project to cap a landfill in Southampton, New
York. 1 4 The contract documents called for the installation of a plastic
liner made with polyvinyl chloride ("PVC").115 The general contractor
subcontracted to Wright Lining and Construction the installation of the
PVC liner. 16 Thereafter the general contractor persuaded the owner to
allow substitution of a different product. 17 When contractor engaged a
different subcontractor to install the substituted liner, Wright sued for
breach of contract.' 18 Wright won a jury verdict. " 9
The general contractor moved for judgment as a matter of law and
111. No. 00-7436, 2001 WL 121863, at *1 (2dCir. Feb. 13, 2001).
112. Id. at *1.
113. Id.
114. Id
115. Wright Lining and Constr. Co., Inc., 2001 WL 121863, at *1.
116. Id. at*1.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Wright Lining and Constr. Co., Inc., 2001 WL 121863, at *1.
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a new trial on the grounds that its actions were allowed by the deletion
clause. 20 That clause read: "the Subcontractor shall have and make no
claim for damages for anticipated profits or for loss of profits...
because of the entire omission of any quantities of items stated in the
'Contractor's Proposal of the Construction Contract."' 12  The general
contractor contended that this language was unambiguous and therefore
should not have been open to interpretation by the jury. 22 The district
court denied that motion and the contractor appealed.
123
The Second Circuit stated that the application of this clause to the
instant case where the entire subcontract was eliminated was
ambiguous. 124 In light of that ambiguity, it was proper for the district
court to allow the jury to resolve the issue of interpreting that contract
clause as question of fact. 
5
D. Suretyship
The Second Circuit did not issue any decisions in 2000-02 bearing
on suretyship issues. There was, however, a decision within the Circuit
of consequence to surety law. The decision, issued by the District Court
for the Southern District of New York in 2000, is International Fidelity
Insurance Co. v. County of Rockland, SWCF. 126
The case concluded that a performance bond surety is liable to an
obligee when a principal delays completion, even though the principal is
not terminated by the obligee. 127 This differs from the usual situation in
owner claims against sureties. In the typical case, an owner, or other
obligee, terminates the principal contractor, and calls upon the surety to
complete the project or otherwise perform its duties under the
performance bond. In this case, however, there had been no
termination. The court nonetheless found the surety liable for delay
damages, stating that "[t]he obligee is not required to formally default
and terminate the contractor in order to obtain the surety's performance
of a contractual obligation, the performance of which would have been
required by the contractor even in the absence of default and
120. Id.
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id.
123. Wright Lining & Constr. Co., Inc., 2001 WL 121863, at *2.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 98 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
127. Id. at411-40.
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termination."'' 28
The case arose under an unusual setting where there had been two
defaults on the project, one followed by another. 129 The project was a
nursing facility owned by Rockland County ("County").130 The first
contractor defaulted, and its surety, International Fidelity Insurance Co.
("IFIC"), pursuant to an AIA Document A3 12-1984 Bond (the "Bond"),
elected to complete the project with a new contractor, 131 Hirani
Contracting Corporation ("Hirani").132  Hirani in turn posted a
performance bond (the "Second Bond") in favor of IFIC, issued by
Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Co. ("F&G"). 133 Thus, with respect to
the completion work, IFIC stood in the position of an owner, and F&G
as the surety obligated to IFIC.
Then Hirani declared bankruptcy and subsequently failed to finish
punch list items. 134  The County then terminated the original
performance bond surety, IFIC, for "failure to cure" but permitted IFIC
to finish the project through yet a third contractor. 35 While IFIC was
taking these steps, it never terminated Hirani.
The County charged IFIC with liquidated damages. 136  IFIC
brought this lawsuit in response, 137 and the County counterclaimed for
its delay damages.
138
Although many issues of state law were raised in this action, the
issue most relevant to this Article relates to the liability of Hirani's
surety to its obligee, IFIC. IFIC sought to hold F&G liable for Hirani's
delays. The legal hurdle for IFIC was that it never defaulted or
terminated Hirani. F&G relied on the condition precedent language of
the bond, which in Paragraph 3 states that "the Surety's obligation under
this Bond shall arise after... [t]he Owner has declared a Contractor
Default and formally terminated the Contractor's right to complete the
,,139
contract ....
128. Id. at 437.
129. Id. at 403.
130. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
131. Id. at407, 411.
132. Id. at 408.
133. Id.
134. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
139. Id, at 432. Paragraph 4 states: "when the Owner has satisfied the conditions of
Paragraph 3, the surety shall promptly and at the Surety's expense take one of the
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The court found that hurdle surmountable. The court first noted
that F&G's obligation to indemnify IFIC for liquidated damages
assessed by the County arising from Hirani's delay came from both the
Second Bond and the Completion Contract incorporated by reference
into the Second Bond. 140 That contract stated that "[t]he Completion
Contractor [Hirani] agrees that it shall be solely responsible to
reimburse the Surety [IFIC] for any liquidated or other damages for
delay as may be claimed by the [County] due to the Completion
Contractor's failure to complete the Contract within said time
period.,
141
The court then considered whether the termination and notice
provisions in Paragraph 3 were a condition precedent to all obligations
for which F&G might be liable, or only to those obligations listed in
Paragraph 4 of the Second Bond. 142  The difference was important
because Paragraph 4 contained the surety's duties to cure a contractor
default, while the court found duties elsewhere in the bond establishing
the surety's liability for damages.
143
The court concluded that the termination and notice provisions
were merely a promise with respect to non-Paragraph 4 obligations.,
44
Applying New York law, the court reasoned that language of the
Second Bond "the Surety's obligation under this Bond shall arise after.
. ." did not contain the "unmistakable language" required by New York
law such as "unless and until" or "condition precedent" to become a
condition rather than a promise as to all obligations.
145
The court further supported its conclusion by examining
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Second Bond. 146 In particular, Paragraph 1
states that "[t]he Contractor [Hirani] and the Surety [F&G], jointly and
severally, bind themselves... to the Owner [IFIC] for the performance
of the Construction Contract." 147  Paragraph 2 states that "[i]f the
[previously described] actions [(I) arranging for the Contractor to perform and
complete, (2) undertaking to perform and complete the Contract, (3) arranging for a new
contractor to contract directly with the Owner to complete and having the Surety pay to
the Owner the damages described in Paragraph 6, or (4) waiving those three choices and
promptly tendering payment to the Owner or formally denying liability]." Id
140. Id. at 433.
141. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 435.
145. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d at 434-35.
146. Id. at 435.
147. Id. (paragraph I states that F&G binds itself (jointly with Hirani) "for the
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Contractor performs the Construction Contract, the Surety and the
Contractor shall have no obligation under this Bond .... 48 Because
Hirani did not complete the contract, the court concluded that F&G was
bound to IFIC for the performance of the contract whether or not IFIC
terminated Hirani.149 The court further reasoned that its decision was
consistent with the construction law precept that delay damages are
assessed even in the absence of default and termination. 1
50
Thus, the court found that F&G was liable for delay damages even
though IFIC never terminated Hirani: "The obligee is not required to
formally default and terminate the contractor in order to obtain the
surety's performance of a contractual obligation, the performance of
which would have been required by the contractor even in the absence
of default and termination."' 5
If followed by other courts, this holding will be of importance to
obligees seeking to enforce claims for liability against a performance
bond surety when the obligee has not complied with the notice and
termination provisions of the bond. Courts may conclude that the
default and termination provisions of a bond are intended in part to
protect the surety from claims of tortious interference and from
overpaying completion contractors. Courts may conclude that these
considerations do not apply to the same extent to a surety's liability for
damages, and may therefore excuse obligees of the termination
condition when only money damages are sought from a surety.
E. Insurance
The Second Circuit also decided issues involving claims against
general contractors' commercial general liability insurance carriers.
performance of the Construction Contract").
148. Id. at 435-36.
149. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 437. The court also stated that its decision is consistent with the risk
allocation embodied in the Second Bond in that,
there is no risk that a surety, asked to indemnify the obligee after a judgment
against that obligee, may be subjected to any potential legal liability for fulfilling
the contractor's contractual indemnification obligation in the absence of a default,
since that obligation (at least in this Completion Contract) was not subject to the
default requirement in the first place.
Id. That lack of risk is in contrast to the risk of claims for tortious interference should
the surety step-in and complete without contractor termination. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 98 F.
Supp. 2d at 437.
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Those cases apply general doctrines of law, but with specific application
to the construction industry.
The most pertinent of those decisions illustrates the rule that a
certificate of insurance is incapable of amending an insurance policy. In
Vinco, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Company of America,152 a general
contractor sued a subcontractor's liability carrier seeking
indemnification as an additional insured for an accident in which the
subcontractor's employee was injured on the construction site.1 53 The
district court held that the general contractor was not an additional
insured under the subcontractor's policy.1 54  The Second Circuit
affirmed. 1
55
The issue arose when an employee of the subcontractor, Hilton
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. ("Hilton"), sued the general contractor,
Vinco, Inc., for an injury sustained at the site.156 Vinco, Inc. sought
indemnification from Royal Insurance Company of America ("Royal"),
arguing that, as is custom in the industry, Vinco was covered as an
additional insured under Hilton's policy. 57 To substantiate its claim,
Vinco presented evidence of its status as an additional insured-a
certificate of insurance. 158 The certificate was issued by an insurance
broker, and in fact, listed Vinco as an additional insured. 59 Though the
certificate stated that the broker was Royal's authorized agent, the
district court held that the certificate did not impose actual contractual
obligations because Vinco did not establish any such agency
relationship. 160 Alternatively, the district court added that even if the
broker was Royal's agent, the issuance of a certificate of insurance was
outside the scope of its authority. 161
The Second Circuit agreed, and further emphasized that certificates
are not insurance policies; rather, they are only informational
documents. 162 The court cautioned against taking certificates as official
documents and suggested asking for a policy to ensure the certificate is
152. No. 01-7411, 2002 WL 337988, at *l (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2002).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *2.
156. Vinco, Inc., 2002 WL 337988, at *1.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Vinco, Inc., 2002 WL 337988, at * 1.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *2.
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accurate. 163
Acceptance of certificates of insurance in the industry is very
common. Yet this case demonstrates that this practice is insufficient to
provide a party with assurance that insurance is in place. Any party
desiring such assurance must go a further step to require a copy of the
insurance policy itself, to be assured of coverage promised in a
certificate of insurance.
A second decision involving a commercial general liability
insurance policy highlights the critical issue of whether an insurer must
show prejudice to disclaim coverage for an insured when the insured
fails to give timely notice of suit. 164 In Booking v. General Star
Management, the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York which
granted summary judgment for the insurer. 165 The Second Circuit held
that district court erroneously applied New York's "no-prejudice" rule
where Texas law, requiring a showing of prejudice for defective notice,
should have governed. 
166
Commercial general liability policies require several specific
obligations of the insured. Among those is the duty to give timely
notice of suit, without which an insurer can disclaim coverage.
Depending on the jurisdiction, an insurer's ability to disclaim coverage
could hinge on the insurer's showing of prejudice regarding the
defective notice. And, as demonstrated by Booking, the consequence of
failing to comply with a policy's notice provision varies by state.
F. Pre-qualification of Bidders
In John Gil Construction, Inc. v. Riverso,167 the Second Circuit, by
summary order, 168 affirmed a final judgment of the United States
163. Id.
164. Booking v. General Star Mgmt., 254 F.3d 414 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Texas
law).
165. Id. at 415.
166. Id. at 423.
167. No. 00-7603,2001 WL 363509, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 12, 2001).
168. The court's decision is by summary order and therefore unpublished. Pursuant
to section 0.23 of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Rules
Relating to the Organization of the Court, the decision was unanimous and "each judge
of the panel believe[d] no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written
opinion." APPEALS TO THE SECOND CIRCUIT, § 0.23 (7 th ed. 1993). Summary order
decisions are not to be cited in unrelated cases before any other court. Id. Although,
some practitioners, thinking such rules to be unconstitutional cite to unpublished
opinions contrary to the Second Circuit's rule, such a practice has its risks. See Thomas
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District Court for the Southern District of New York and held that a
contractor has no cognizable property interest in its prequalified-bidder
status conferred by the New York City School Construction Authority
(the "SCA"). 169 In so holding, the court rejected the contractor's claims
that the defendants violated its right to procedural due process. 170
The issue arose from the following facts. 171 In August 1995, John
Gil Construction, Inc. ("JGC") applied for, and was granted,
prequalified-bidder status by the SCA.172 Such status is necessary for a
contractor to enter into a contract for school construction in New York
City.1 73  Approximately one year later, a different city agency, New
York City Off-Track Betting Corporation ("OTB") 174 awarded JGC a
construction contract for non-school construction. 175 Billing
irregularities in JGC's contract with OTB, however, prompted a
criminal investigation of JGC 176 by the Inspector General for OTB and
the Department of Investigation for the City of New York ("DOI"),
ultimately resulting in its conviction on twelve counts of fraud. 177
At some point prior to JGC's conviction, the SCA was informed of
the pending investigation. Upon that notice, the SCA notified JGC that
it might suspend JGC's prequalified-bidder status, which it did on June
1, 1999, not having received a satisfactory explanation as to reasons for
E. Zehnle, Unpublished Decisions Are Off-Limits in Ninth Circuit, LITIGATION NEWS, at
7 (Jan. 2002). The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has found its rule forbidding citations to
unpublished decisions to be constitutional. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th
Cir. 2001).
169. John Gil Constr., Inc., 2001 WL 363509, at *1. The court also held that the
contractor failed to demonstrate "any violation of a liberty interest sufficient to support a
due process claim." Id. Procedurally, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's
granting of the defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. John Gil Constr., Inc. v. Riverso, No. 99 Civ. 6112, Opinion
and Order at 2 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 6, 2000). Because the plaintiff had amended its complaint
three times, and each time failed to successfully state a cognizable property interest or
sufficient violation of a liberty interest, the trial court dismissed the complaint without
leave to amend. Id. at 27-28.
170. John Gil Constr., Inc., 2001 WL 363509, at *1.
171. John Gil Constr., Inc., Opinion and Order at 4. By virtue of the decision by
summary order and the scant discussion in the Second Circuit's opinion, it appears that
the court views its reasoning as trite. Accordingly, it is necessary to turn to the trial
court decision for analysis of the issues.
172. -d. at5.
173. See N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 1734(3) (McKinney 1999).
174. John Gil Constr., Inc., Opinion and Order at 5.
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id. at 5.
177. John Gil Constr., Inc. v. Riverso, No. 00-7603, 2001 WL 363509, at *1 (2d
Cir. Apr. 12, 2001).
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the investigation. 118  JGC challenged the SCA's decision under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as a deprivation of property without due process. 179 The
district court rejected JGC's contention, and the Second Circuit
agreed.
180
The crux of both courts' analysis turned on finding that JGC had
no property interest in its prequalified bidder status and that its liberty
interest in its good name and reputation was not damaged by the state
actors.1 81 "To have a protected property interest, 'a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more
than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.' 1 82 Furthermore, in the case where a statute
and regulation "vests in the state significant discretion over the
continued conferral of a benefit, it will be the rare case that the recipient
will be able to establish an entitlement to that benefit." 183 The district
court found sufficient discretion in the statues and regulations to
determine that contractors do not have a property interest in
prequalification status conferred by the SCA. 184  The Second Circuit
agreed. 185
Recently, various construction industry groups have lobbied to pass
prequalified-bidder legislation for public projects in the State of
Connecticut. 186  One lesson public owners may draw from John Gil
178. John Gil Constr., Inc., Opinion and Order at 6.
179. Id. at 1. JGC also attempted to have its suspension revoked and two contracts,
for which it alleged to be the lowest bidder, awarded to it by the SCA. See John Gil
Constr., Inc. v. Riverso, 72 F. Supp. 2d 242, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). JGC alleged that it
would suffer irreparable harm because the SCA was required to report the revocation to
the Vendor Information Exchange System ("VENDEX"). Id. at 250. The consequence
of which would preclude JGC from receiving award of any contract from any city
agency. Id. at 250. Because one-hundred percent of JGC's revenue was from public
contracts, the company's losses would be irreparable. Id. at 251 n.6. Although the court
agreed with the potential of irreparable harm, for reasons stated in this Article, the court
found that JGC could not prevail on the merits, and therefore denied JGC's application.
John Gil Constr., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d at 254, 256.
180. John Gil Constr., Inc., Opinion and Order at 11; John Gil Constr., Inc., 2001
WL 363509, at *1.
181. John Gil Constr., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d at 252; John Gil Constr., Inc., Opinion
and Order at 11-13.
182. John Gil Constr., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d at 251 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
183. Id. at 252 (citing Kelly Kare, Ltd. v. O'Rourke, 930 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir.
1991)).
184. Id. at 252.
185. John Gil Constr., Inc., 2001 WL 363509, at *1.
186. 2003 Conn. Pub. Acts 03-215 (effective Oct. 1, 2004).
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Construction, Inc. is to leave sufficient discretion with the qualifying
body so that companies may make no claims to entitlement to its status
as a pre-qualified bidder.
III. CONCLUSION
As may be discerned from the variety of disputes before the
Second Circuit, many areas of law govern construction claims. These
past three years saw disputes that turned on the rules of contract, due
process, insurance, surety, tort and warranty. Some were exclusive to
the construction industry; others were general rules applied in a specific
manner unique to construction. As such, construction lawyers must
maintain a high degree of proficiency in many areas of law. This also
demonstrates that advocates will benefit from creativity in finding
doctrines from other fields to apply to their cases.
